

climate change and conflict – a green economy to promote human security

“If any free society cannot help the many because they are poor, they cannot save the few who are rich.”

J.F. Kennedy

by Huzi I. Mshelia

introduction

All over Nigeria, we witness the ongoing unsustainable management of natural resources. Scarcity has led to a scramble for water, minerals and other resources, and indeed to conflict. At the same time, Nigeria is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Climate change acts as a “threat multiplier”, exacerbating existing stresses and creating volatile situations. While there is a global consensus on this multiplier effect, the security implications of climate change are less well understood. They may well be much greater than people at present think. The costs of adaptation to the impacts of climate change are very large and will negatively impact on economic development. The cost of inaction would, however, be even greater.

problem statement

We have to ask ourselves, has the intense exploitation or scarcity of resources led to or exacerbated conflicts in Nigeria? How strong is the nexus between climate change and the present wave of conflicts around the country? What are the consequences of these conflicts for national and regional security? Will the adoption of a green economy vision and providing access to green energy for all (amongst other important recommendations contained in this report) improve security for ordinary Nigerians?

overview: the climate - conflict nexus

Today, the effects of climate change are manifesting themselves worldwide: rising temperatures, more severe droughts and extreme weather events like floods and hurricanes. The 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimated that already 25% of Africa’s population experience high levels of water stress and that by 2050, up to 600 million Africans will be at risk.

According to the Central Bank of Nigeria, the nation’s agricultural sector accounts for 42% of GDP and employs about 60% of the workforce. Agriculture is largely rain-fed, making the sector very climate sensitive and the entire economy highly vulnerable to climate change. The impacts of climate change are ravaging the northern states, gradually turning the region into a semi-arid zone and increasing the rate of desertification. Nigeria's southern region has had to cope with severe incidences of coastal and soil erosion. This is undermining the economic asset base, destroying human settlements and livelihoods, which could invariably lead to the deterioration of security. In the south, we observe an increase in communal clashes over farming land and a struggle for control over depleting natural

resources. In the north, the unrest has taken on a deadly dimension.

The generally accepted scientific view is that climate change *per se* does not cause conflict. Its effects on fragile ecosystems and societies, already under pressure from a lack of economic opportunities, will however, exacerbate existing threats and insecurities. There is scientific consensus that Africa and Nigeria will face severe climate change impacts and the impacts will be aggravated by low adaptive capacity. If not properly managed, these impacts could lead to deaths in areas with high physical vulnerability and/or those with a dense population, low community resilience and weak governance.

The government's economic blueprint, the Vision 20:2020, recognises the risk when it observed that,

“Over the next decade, climate change is expected to assume greater significance and influence over the actions of the international community and between the key actors in the global landscape. The potential for climate change to bring about damaging and irrecoverable effects on infrastructure, food production and water supplies, in addition to precipitating natural resource conflicts makes it a critical challenge that must be effectively responded to by any economy seeking sustainable growth in the years leading up to 2020.”

“My view about life in Nigeria; it’s not too easy; it’s not that easy because in Nigeria now we’re facing so many difficulties, so many problems: insecurity, unemployment, bad roads, water. You know, Nigerians are suffering and all this insecurity is also caused by all the little things we don’t have in our country; unemployment, no good roads or water. Assuming at these things are available in Nigeria, I don’t think somebody who is reasonable will stand up to say let me carry gun or carry bomb to go and kill myself or kill somebody else so our country is very, very difficult and we need to do something about it.”

ABC1, 20 – 25, Female, Abuja Urban

There seems to be some consensus amongst international experts that there are grave security implications of the impacts of climate change. The US Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) observed that climate change *“could have significant geopolitical impacts around the world, contributing to poverty, environmental degradations and further weakening of fragile governments.”* It warned that food and water scarcity, and mass migration out of affected areas, will increase the *“burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world.”* The IPCC's Special Report on Extreme Weather Events notes that climate change can *“fuel violence and conflicts within and between states.”*ⁱ

The intense and often unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in Nigeria has increased economic inequality and resulted in abject poverty in the midst of plenty. We contend that the lack of a compelling, unifying socially-inclusive vision for the whole country and the absence of a robust sustainable development strategy, combined with rising unemployment, widespread poverty, a growing population and over-dependence on natural resources sensitive to climatic changes, make Nigeria highly vulnerable to resource-based-conflicts that will be exacerbated by climate change. In the author's view, inefficient management of natural resources and widespread corruption have contributed to the ongoing militancy in the Niger Delta. The agitation for equitable distribution of dwindling resources has now become linked to a new wave of violence perpetrated in parts of the north. Day-to-day reality and the lack of a truly unifying national vision have made it difficult for the majority of the population to identify with government programs. This lack of trust is exemplified by the rising level of protest. If this view is proven to be correct, Nigeria is set for more violent conflicts over resources in the years to come.

Climate impacts and the implications for human security

The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007), identified Nigeria as a climate change “hot spot” likely to see major shifts in weather patterns in the 21st century. The 2011 Climate Change Vulnerability Index published by the UK-based risk company Maplecroft, classified Nigeria as being at “high risk”. The country’s northern arid zone is already facing excessive heat with less than 10 inches of rainfall in a year; 25% less than that observed 30 years ago. The projected temperature rise to more than 40 degrees Celsius would further increase variability in rainfall. It would lead to flooding in the south, while decreased precipitation would result in droughts in the north. Extreme weather events have become more frequent in recent years, with major floods in 2012 across large swaths of land throughout Nigeria. Scores of lives were lost. Perversely, floods are often accompanied by droughts.

Variability in rainfall will affect river flow patterns, negatively impacting on irrigation and hydro-power potential. This can be observed in the Lake Chad basin and along the Niger River. The loss of livelihoods in the fisheries and ancillary industries is creating a sense of hopelessness. The resulting migration puts pressure on cities already saturated with unemployed youths. Some might well become willing tools in the hands of radical groups or some urban gangs.

The First Nigerian National Communication under the UNFCCC (2003) estimates that the nation’s southern coastline is susceptible to sea level rise of between 0.5 and 1.0 meter by the end of the century. Were the sea level to rise up to one meter, between 45 and 50 million people will be affected and/or relocated. The coastal region is home to most of Nigeria's industry, thus making the economy even more vulnerable. A study commissioned by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in 2009, estimated that in the absence of adaptation measures between 2 and 11% of Nigeria’s GDP could be lost by 2020. This was largely because, with sea level rise, onshore oil fields could become submerged resulting in higher production costs, reduced investment and deference or outright loss of production.



The state of the nation's freshwater resources is already critical, with the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) rating Nigeria’s water use and conservation practices as “poor” by both international and African standards. Only about 8% of homes have access to treated pipe-borne water. As shown above, climate change will exacerbate water shortages in much of northern Nigeria. Southern Nigeria's coastal areas face contamination of freshwater due to increased flooding and saltwater intrusion due to sea level rise. Given the currently projected population growth – UNDP estimates that Nigerians will count up to 255 million in 2030 - the issue of water and its possible scarcity will need to be given high priority by the government in order to avoid serious conflict.

Another critical risk is the pattern of land use and the availability of productive land. Desertification has affected most of northern Nigeria, with the federal government officially declaring 11 northern states as “frontline states”. The 2002 *National Action Programme to Combat Desertification and Mitigate the Effects of Drought* notes that

“between 50% and 75% of Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kano, Kebbi, Kaduna, Sokoto, Yobe, Adamawa and Zamfara states in Nigeria are being affected by desertification. These states, with a population of about 29 million people, account for about 43% of the country’s total land area.

In these areas, population pressure resulting in over grazing and over exploitation of marginal lands has aggravated desertification and drought. Entire villages and major access roads have been buried under sand dunes in the extreme northern parts of Katsina, Sokoto, Jigawa, Borno and Yobe States.”

The southern and Niger Delta region are low-lying and have experienced decades of unsustainable land use. This densely populated area with vulnerable economic assets presents a real development challenge, which is further amplified by climate change impacts. Sea level rise of 1.5 foot (50 cm) would submerge more than 11,000 km² of coastal land.

Official statistics are lacking on the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria even though a US State Department report estimates that about 3 million people were displaced by conflict between 1999 and 2006. That notwithstanding, the incidence of internal migration has become a national security concern that will be further aggravated by resource scarcity, climate change effects and unemployment.

The extent and scale of Nigeria’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate change will be underscored and determined by the government’s response measures and the societies’ ability to increase their resilience to disasters. Where the government cannot cope adequately, this will have economic consequences and heightens the risk of conflicts, ultimately threatening national security.

Responding to complexity and uncertainty

Socio-political climate challenges are capable of weakening states and communities. They will severely stress any government's ability to coordinate and organise an effective response. Inadequate government responses to a crisis create a perception of injustice among those whose expectations for remedial action were not met. As a result, the credibility of the government may be called into question, respect for political leaders is eroded and the relationship between government and its people turns sour. The heightened tension and instability may result in unrest, violence, criminality, even insurgency.



In Nigeria, the fear of violence is legitimate as there already is a deep-rooted perception that the government is corrupt and unaccountable, which has led to agitation against officials and institutions. Climate change has introduced risks not previously envisaged by policies or governance arrangements and neither is climate change factored in the management of natural and economic resources particularly in the conflict situations in the Niger Delta, extreme northern part and some parts of the Middle Belt. This is despite the fact that the nexus between availability of

energy, human development and human security has been well established. A 2002 UNDP analysis shows significant improvement in the Human Development Index of Ghana, Senegal, China, Malaysia and Chile following improvements in the provision of energy services. For any solution to be viable, it must sustainably mobilise resources to support the implementation. Solutions must reflect gender considerations and make those most vulnerable, who are often socially excluded, part of decision making. They must include self-evaluation and monitoring mechanisms.

The weak governmental response can, in part, be explained by an inadequate assessment. Increasing the knowledge base and broadening options for government institutions - and the security services in particular - is imperative. Unfortunately, the current academic discussion on climate change and security

is, at times, of limited practical use to policy makers. The reasons for this gap between science and policy include:

- the lack of full analysis and assessment of climate-related disasters and their implications
- a lack of reliable data
- the narrow focus on conflict as the only security outcome of interest
- insufficient attention being paid to variations in vulnerability at the local level.

Fact is, the full security implications of climate change cannot yet be assessed with a high degree of certainty. The IPCC Special Report on *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation* (SREX) provided some projections on the likely extent of climate-related disasters and the nature and level of risk management required. However, no quantifiable data on the potential damages are available.

Inconsistent implementation and discontinuity in policy making is a problem. Successive governments have tended to jettison existing policies and initiating new ones, even if the change is just in name.

The role of traditional institutions

Community responses to climate change cannot be predicted. Community relations with the most vulnerable, who bear the consequences of the misdistribution of natural resources and lack of economic opportunities, are of real concern. In a rare display of distrust, during the post-election violence in parts of northern Nigeria, some traditional rulers were physically attacked and their properties vandalised by angry youths who felt these leaders had conspired with the political system to perpetuate inequality and corruption. The traditional institutions are suddenly faced with a credibility problem and are viewed with scepticism. The traditional conflict mediation and reconciliation mechanisms that were once deployed to effectively settle conflicts are being jeopardised and their future potential for resolving climate-related conflicts has, thus, become uncertain.

conflict trends and dynamics

Based on the current state-of-knowledge, the following trends and dynamics are anticipated. The costs of adapting to these will be very high and certainly impact on the GDP. Even assuming money was available, adaptation alone cannot resolve these problems:

migration

Under a business-as-usual scenario, the intensity and frequency of the climate-induced desertification in the north and coastal erosion in the south will continue to affect the production capacities of the densely populated farming and fishing communities respectively, resulting in increased migration. Such migration is likely to be local, within the affected states, as well as regional. All of West Africa will have to face the impacts of these uncontrolled movements.

Lagos, Kano, Kaduna, Port Harcourt and Ibadan are typical examples of rural-urban migration leading to overpopulation, unemployment and a lack of social amenities. Government institutions are unable to adequately respond to disasters, as was witnessed during the floods in September and October 2012. The sprawling slums are potential hotspots and



provide the base for gangsters and militias.

unemployment

Currently, 60% of the nation's population is between the age of 15 and 30. Some studies have shown that in particular alienated young people lacking in resources and economic opportunity are most likely to join rebellion. Jobless youths could deepen the recruitment pool for violent political groups. A 2010 British Council study contains some pertinent findings:

- i. If Nigeria fails to collect its demographic dividend, the seriousness of the country's predicament should not be underestimated. Its prospect will be bleak and could be catastrophic.*
- ii. In the worse case, Nigeria will see: growing numbers of restless young people frustrated by lack of opportunity; increased competition for jobs, land, natural resources and political patronage; cities that are increasingly unable to cope with the pressures placed on them; ethnic and religious conflict and radicalization; and a political system discredited by its failure to improve lives.*
- iii. Demography is pushing Nigerian states and regions into widely different economic trajectories and could further increase inequality if measures are not taken to promote social cohesion.ⁱⁱ*

shrinking resources

Resources become less accessible and scarcer with a growing population. A United States House of Representative's Committee on Energy report noted that *"the densely-populated and oil rich Niger Delta is already the scene of conflicts over the sharing of oil revenues. Land loss and increased risk of storms will exacerbate these tensions as well as the challenge of maintaining the existing oil infrastructure."* Unless the government demonstrates more transparency in the management of oil resources, diversifies the economy and reduces its dependence on the petroleum resource, the conflict situation will likely persist. The mass protests over the withdrawal of the petrol subsidy in early 2012 demonstrated peoples' increasing resolve to demand accountability of how the nation's resources are being exploited. Over-dependence has led to the inability of most state governments to look beyond the monthly oil subvention as the only source of income. Conflicts and insecurity in the north would have been greatly reduced had the states invested in irrigation and small-scale entrepreneurship schemes that have the potential to provide livelihoods.



Yusuf Darama, Toshua village in Yobe State: "I am a farmer. The most serious problem we face here in Toshua is poverty. I am begging God and the government of Yobe State to help us and our parents. And then there is the desert... it is our main worry. We don't even have roads to bring food into our village – the desert is too much. None of us has a job, whether we have gone to school or not. Even those with a diploma... there are five of them here, they don't get work. But most of us have no education, and besides farming we have nothing to do. And when the rainy season is over, there is nothing."

Other scenarios predict "water wars." Water capture around Lake Chad would undermine existing water-sharing agreements and fuel conflict. Supply disruptions caused by scarcity, hoarding and withholding of vital water resources may cause conflicts within states as groups vie for access. Groups that are unable to access the necessary resources, either through the markets or bilateral arrangements, may ultimately resort to the use of force.

The Lake Chad basin

Lake Chad once was one of the largest lakes in Africa. Over the past 30 years it has shrunk by about 97%. Over 25 million people from four countries - Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger - depend on the lake for drinking water, irrigation and fishing. The Nigerian side of the lake has almost completely dried up and Nigerian fishermen have to cross to the Chadian side for fishing. Most of the time they are chased back or arrested and their boats and catches confiscated. Resource scarcity has developed into a potential security problem. Most of the youths formerly at work around the lake have had to migrate to major cities like Maiduguri, in search of scarce jobs. It is not unlikely that some have, out of frustration, become willing recruits for radical groups like Boko Haram, thinking they fight for social justice from an inept political leadership.

population

It is estimated that by 2030, Nigeria's population will have grown to up to 250 million people, requiring concomitant increases in food and water supplies. As a result, competition over land will increase. A gap already exists between the present population and the arable land available for food production, particularly in areas most vulnerable to climate change. Those without access to land can be expected to migrate to sprawling urban areas. These cities will fast outgrow the ability of their hinterland to provide for them.

urbanisation

Perceived economic opportunities as the main "pull" of urbanisation combines with the "push" of instability, forced migration and environmental consequences of climate change. The majority will settle in unplanned shantytowns. This will increase the burden on government, an already over-stretched infrastructure network and natural resources. This trend is also likely to increase competition over land, affordable accommodation, employment and access to resources. Rapid and uncontrolled urbanisation without commensurate economic growth and industrialisation to develop an effective infrastructure and associated support structures will challenge urban governance and generate instability, poverty and inequality. Most of the urban poor will be employed in the informal sector and will be highly vulnerable to externally driven economic shocks and illicit exploitation capable of triggering civil conflicts. According to the UN Urbanisation Prospects Database 2007, mega cities will contain only some 10% of the world's urban dwellers whilst 50% of them are expected to live in urban areas of less than 500,000 people. These areas are likely to absorb nearly half the projected increase in the urban population and face the greatest shortfalls in infrastructure and service provisions, increasing the risk of conflict leading to insurgency. The need for humanitarian assistance will increase.

global change

Though Africa is viewed as one of the regions with a high potential for growth, the aversion to political and investment risk and a drop in demand from Europe and the USA has resulted in a drop in trade and investment flows. However, the demand for commodities by the emerging economies remains strong. The global financial crisis has seen most of Nigeria's traditional development partners making policy shifts that affect their existing commitments. For example, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) was forced by Congress to cut budgets.

In the long term, a global shift to renewable energy could affect the nation's oil sector, the source of over 90% of the Nigeria's foreign exchange. In the medium term, oil producing countries that fail to diversify their economies might be negatively impacted by a future legally binding agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that is expected to require more urgent mitigation action by developing nations.

Increased regional cooperation and trans-boundary arrangements for the management of shared natural resources, particularly the Lake Chad and the River Niger basins, will need to be closely managed and strengthened to avoid regional conflicts.

existing policies and intervention options

The ambitious government Vision 20:2020 aims at rapid economic growth and an increase in annual per capita income to US\$ 9,000 from less than US\$ 1,000 today. It envisages Nigeria to be one of the world's top 20 economies by 2020. Vision 2020 sets ambitious targets for energy access, healthcare, modern transport systems and agricultural production and export. It also aims to introduce efficiency in oil production, increase utilisation of gas for electricity and stop gas flaring. The Vision advocates a sustainable development pathway that is cognisant of climate change and pursues measures to address climate impacts.

To address the climate challenge, the government has created the Department for Climate Change in the Ministry of Environment with responsibility for formulating its response to climate change. The Department has in collaboration with development partners developed the National Adaptation Strategic Plan of Action (NASPA) outlining strategies for all sectors of the economy. Similarly, a Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) plan is being developed to guide emissions reductions across the economy.

None of the relevant government policies on agriculture (NIRSAL), water (National Water and Sanitation policy), land (Presidential Land Reform Committee), energy (the Power Roadmap) and environment (National Policy on Environment) have adequately considered the security dimension of climate change. Maybe not surprisingly, Nigeria's security policy is hardly open to public discussion. Since 2010, the administration has made large financial allocations for security, ostensibly the Niger Delta amnesty programme and to combat terrorism. Little or no attention is paid to the environmental dimension. The government should vigorously pursue a novel approach that 'insures' the nation against serious climate security problems by implementing measures that deliver results even if the worst-case environmental changes are avoided. This goes well beyond the no-regrets policies commonly adopted.

governance options and recommendations

- Nigeria can avoid large-scale human suffering and the related monetary cost by improving the understanding of the nexus between climate change and security and by responding to the need for more information and better management of data. For example, no up-to-date vulnerability assessment exists. Training is crucial to build up the necessary institutional capacity;
- A comprehensive mapping of causes of conflicts, potential conflict hotspots and remedial actors in each state and across ecological regions should be undertaken;
- Increasing energy access, particularly from renewable sources, will enhance human and economic development, thereby reducing tension. A programme for climate-compatible development can accelerate the deployment of locally appropriate renewable energy technologies that are available, efficient and affordable. An investment push for renewable energy is needed to create jobs. For example, small-scale cottage agricultural estates served by irrigation schemes could provide all-year income and solar-powered mini enterprises will guarantee food security and reduce tension;
- Climate-resilient agricultural practices and affordable climate risk insurance can protect poor

farmers from the vagaries of climate change and will keep them in business. Robust adaptation programs will increase agricultural production, which in turn will create new jobs. Such programs deliver gender-inclusive development and slow urbanisation;

- Given the high conflict-potential, existing regional cooperation platforms for the management of the River Niger and the Lake Chad basin, should be transformed;
- Every challenge is an opportunity: the current security threat can unite Nigerians against violence. This will only happen if people can identify with a re-defined national vision. Strong political leadership supported by well-equipped institutions is imperative to tackle the trends identified. Strong, competent and development-focused governance will be required to deliver the recommended interventions.

the risk of failure**imagine not...**

What happens if Nigeria continues with business-as-usual, allowing resource scarcities and uneven distribution of income from natural resources to foster conflict and strife? A troubling picture emerges where extreme drought and excessive rains force millions of people to move into the middle belt, looking for food, shelter and employment. In the absence of trusted institutions that are capable of handling emergency situations, people will stand up for themselves and their families, opening the door to more ethnic and religious conflict.

Water and land may become so scarce that guards need to be posted around farm land and water wells. Vigilante groups will have the potential to turn defensive action into aggression against neighbours and other perceived enemies.

Almost every parcel of land will be claimed by multiple owners as traditional and government systems of managing land ownership are not reconciled. International agribusiness companies will defend large-scale farms with capital-intensive precision agriculture for export in the midst of teeming, desperate communities.

Government at the state and federal level will be unable to direct internally displaced people to settlements where they could rebuild their lives because hardly any surveys are available to show what to grow where and how to feed so many people on limited space.

In some border areas, people will be migrating between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Benin on a seasonal basis, going where the rains fall and where the rivers flow. In the absence of cross-border agreements, the governments of these countries will accuse each other of supporting illegal migration and conflict rather than seeking to support the people in finding food and livelihoods...

conclusion

By crafting a vision with which all can identify and which promotes national cohesion and reduces tensions, the current deplorable security situation might ultimately serve to unify Nigerians. To reduce the potential for conflict, the government has to foster an atmosphere of social justice and equity. The poor and those less privileged should not simply be “consulted” on the management of natural resources but be empowered to actively participate in decision-making processes. Thus the governance of natural resources is made more transparent and accountable.

Increasing the knowledge and understanding of the security implications of climate change is important for the sustainable development of any country, particularly for those most vulnerable to climate change. It is now widely accepted that there is an urgent need for the government to support the creation of jobs for the teeming youths, particularly in the rural areas. This will reduce internal migration and rapid urbanisation and thus the risk of urban insurgency. Agriculture currently employs over 60% of the workforce. The sector and especially the associated industries can potentially create more employment. Support for rural small and medium-sized industries should be prioritised. These can be powered by clean energy from renewable sources. The optimal utilisation of the nation’s renewable energy resources will create employment and reduce the scope for conflict. Finally, the government's adaptation and mitigation programmes should be used as entry points for integrating security considerations into national development plans.

“Another thing is if the government is determined to change this nation, this nation will change ... so now, if I say I must achieve this particular aim in fifty years time, it is my duty to work towards it seriously. ... If the Government should do so that I am determined to drive corruption out of this country, no matter who is involved even if it is my wife or my husband or my son or my daughter, they can.”

ABC1, 20 – 25, Female, Abuja Urban¹

“If you are saying we should sit with the government that means we still have a lot of work to do. I will say for me to be in my dreamland, all I need to do is to set a goal, work hard, believe in God and do my best and leave the rest. You will need to work hard towards seeing your dreamland. It has to do with the individual. For instance, if she’s doing something like going into agriculture... it means we are coming together to form something, I believe we will make it.”

ABC1, 16 – 19, Female, Lagos Urban



Huzi Ishaku Mshelia, author, is a trained lawyer with orientation in energy and environmental matters. He is a Director of Clean Energy, an organization working on policy and legal issues in climate change, energy and environment and a partner in the law firm of Huzi & Associates. He works extensively on climate change related issues and is consulting for several local and international organizations including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), UNDP, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Nigeria (hbs), Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth and the Federal Ministry of Environment. He has several papers and presentations, and has contributed to the development of many policy documents including the OECD's *Low Emission Development Strategies (LED): Technical, Institutional and Policy Lessons (2010)* and United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) *Green Economy in the Context of Sustainable Development: what implications for Africa (2012)*. He currently serves as consultant on climate governance to the

Nigerian Infrastructure Advisory Facility (NAIF-2), a DFID funded project seeking to build climate resilience into national infrastructural development. Mr. Mshelia also serves as member on some government committees including the Legal Committee of the National Council for Privatization, the National Committee on Torture and the Federal Ministry of Environment.

The author can be contacted at hmsshelia2@gmail.com

Footnotes

i IPCC, 2012: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, 582 pp., at <http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/report/>

ii *Nigeria – The Next Generation*, at http://www.britishcouncil.org/next_generation_nigeria_report.pdf